Libel and Slander - Qualified Privilege - A Mercantile Agency Relying on a Qualified Privilege as Defense to a Charge of Libel Must Reveal Its Sources of Information for the Purpose of Establishing Whether or Not There Was Probable Cause to Believe that the Allegedly Libelous Statement Was True. Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Cal. 1965) by McDade, J. Michael
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 1966 Article 15 
1-1-1966 
Libel and Slander - Qualified Privilege - A Mercantile Agency 
Relying on a Qualified Privilege as Defense to a Charge of Libel 
Must Reveal Its Sources of Information for the Purpose of 
Establishing Whether or Not There Was Probable Cause to Believe 
that the Allegedly Libelous Statement Was True. Stationers Corp. 
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Cal. 1965) 
J. Michael McDade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. M. McDade, Libel and Slander - Qualified Privilege - A Mercantile Agency Relying on a Qualified Privilege 
as Defense to a Charge of Libel Must Reveal Its Sources of Information for the Purpose of Establishing 
Whether or Not There Was Probable Cause to Believe that the Allegedly Libelous Statement Was True. 
Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Cal. 1965), 3 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 127 (1966). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol3/iss1/15 
This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
LIBEL AND SLANDER-QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE-A MER-
CANTILE AGENCY RELYING ON A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AS
DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF LIBEL MUST REVEAL ITS SOURCES
OF INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THAT THE ALLEGEDLY LIBELOUS STATEMENT WAS TRUE. Sta-
tioners Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Cal. 1965).
Dun & Bradstreet, a mercantile agency, published two reports at
a client's request concerning the potential effect of a pending suit
filed against Stationers Corporation and two of its officers. Accord-
ing to the reports, the complaint alleged a fraudulent misappro-
priation of corporation assets in that two officers of the company
had set unnecessarily large salaries for themselves. The reports fur-
ther stated that Stationers' management had not been available for
comment on the suit and that in outside quarters a "number of
authorities" were of the opinion that the suit had merit.
Stationers Corporation and the two officers filed a complaint
against Dun & Bradstreet and one of iis employees, alleging defa-
mation of business, libel and negligence, asserting that the reports
were false, that the defendants did not have probable cause to be-
lieve their statements to be true, and that the publications were
made with actual malice. The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming a qualified privilege for the publications under Civil
Code section 47(3), which extends a privilege to publications made
on request, without malice between legitimately interested parties.
In support of their motion the defendants filed declarations assert-
ing that the reports were made in good faith and without malice.
The declarations described the method by which the defendants
compiled and distributed the two reports. Although failing to reveal
the identity of the sources relied upon, the declarations did assert
that the informants were believed to be reliable and truthful in their
statements. In opposition to the defendants' motion the plaintiffs
filed a declaration asserting that they were unable to contravene
the statements contained in the reports because the defendants re-
fused to reveal their sources of information. The defendants' motion
for summary judgment was granted by the trial court and affirmed
by the district court of appeal.
The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held
that: (1) reports of mercantile agencies are accorded the statutory
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privilege of Civil Code section 47(3) when they meet its require-
ments; (2) on a motion for summary judgment a mercantile agency
sued for libel cannot rely upon the statutory privilege without dis-
closing its sources and information in its possession necessary to
determine whether the statements were without malice and, there-
fore, a triable issue of fact was raised as to whether defendants had
probable cause to believe their published statements to be true and,
therefore, whether they acted with malice. Stationers Corp. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449
(1965).
Reports of mercantile agencies, when made without malice to one
who has an interest in the subject matter of the communication, have
been held to be qualifiedly privileged by all American jurisdictions,
which have considered the question except Idaho and Georgia.2
Idaho followed the English rule as set forth in Maclntosh v. Dun,8
which does not allow a privilege for mercantile agencies on the
grounds that they are motivated by self-interest and desire for profit
rather than by a sense of duty to the community as a whole and,
as a result, should be penalized if they report anything but the truth.4
The Georgia case, Johnson v. Bradstreet Co.,5 has been criticized
as poorly reasoned because it based denial of the privilege on some-
what questionable moral abhorrence of mercantile agencies rather
than on the legal issues involved.
A negative approach to the function of mercantile agencies and
the downgrading of their contributions to the business community
have provided a popular theme for law review articles in recent
years, with some writers taking the position that strict liability, or
at least a standard of due care, should be imposed on such agencies
for any false publication, regardless of malice, for social policy
1 United States jurisdictions allowing a qualified privilege: Arkansas, California,
District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776.
2 Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet
Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914); see Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776, 780 (1953).
3 [1908] A.C. 390. In this case, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council went
against the previous weight of authority in British cases by holding that a communica-
tion is not privileged if it was made from motives of self-interest by those who for the
convenience of a class trade for profit in the characters of other persons and who offer
for sale information which may have been improperly obtained, even if it was discreetly
sought.
4 Id. at 400.
5 77 Ga. 172 (1886).
6 Note, 2 DE PAUL L. REv. 69, 73 (1952-53).
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reasons.7 However, as Professor Jeremiah Smith pointed out in his
authoritative article on this topic:
It might be inferred from some statements adverse to mercantile
agencies, that these agencies communicate to inquiring subscribers
only such information as is unfavorable to an applicant for credit.
But in fact their answers are frequently, and probably in a decided
majority of instances, favorable to the applicant .... 8
A realization that the principal purpose of these agencies is of posi-
tive value rather than sinister in nature is probably the primary
reason why a qualified privilege is afforded in most jurisdictions
which have considered the issue.
The defense of qualified privilege has been codified in California,9
but prior to Stationers no California case had considered application
of the privilege to a mercantile agency.10 The court in Stationers
held that the privilege does extend to such agencies provided the
requirements of the code section are met. This aspect of the case
alone is of significant importance to California mercantile agencies.
In extending the privilege the court was able to rely on an analogous
situation in Pavlovsky v. Board of Trade," where it was held that
Civil Code section 47(3) applied to a merchants' protective asso-
ciation whose members reported the names of debtors to it and the
membership then jointly refused credit to those whose names had
been reported.
The plaintiffs in Stationers contended that the defendants did not
have probable cause to believe the statements contained in their
reports to be true and that this lack of probable cause in effect con-
7 See Note, 36 N.D.L. REv. 201 (1960) ; Note, 11 S.C.L.Q. 256 (1959) ; Note, 31
TEMPLE L.Q. 50 (1957).
8 Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies, 14 COL. L. REv. 187, 198
(1914).
9 CAL. Cw. CODE § 47(1)-(5) contains the available qualified privileges. Subdivision
3 contains the qualified privilege that is pertinent to Stationers: "A privileged publica-
tion or broadcast is one made-....
3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one
who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to the person interested
as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication in-
nocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information."
10 Mercantile agencies are defined as: "establishments which make a business of
collecting information relating to the credit, character, responsibility and reputation
of merchants, for the purpose of furnishing the information to subscribers." BLACK,
LAw DicrioNARY (4th ed. 1951).
11 171 Cal. App. 2d 110, 340 P.2d 63 (1959).
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stituted actual, or express, malice- which resulted in a loss of the
qualified privilege.13 In the United States there is a split of authority
as to whether want of probable cause for an allegedly libelous pub-
lication is sufficient to infer actual malice and hence bar the defense
of a qualified privilege. 4 However, in California it has been held
that actual malice may be inferred by a court or a jury where prob-
able cause is not established by the defendant who relies on a quali-
fied privilege.15 Under the California rule, when actual malice is
alleged in the complaint the defendant claiming a qualified privi-
lege has the burden of proving absence of malice. 16 If he can make
a prima facie showing of absence of malice or of existence of prob-
able cause, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff. 17 Thus, the de-
fendants in Stationers attempted to rebut the inferred malice by
establishing that they had probable cause to believe the information
contained in their reports was true. The defendants' contention that
they were not required to reveal the source of their information in
order to rebut the inferred malice and establish their good faith was
rejected by the court. The court was unable to draw upon any civil
12 Actual malice requires an adverse or evil intent, as opposed to legal, or constructive
malice, which is imputed to every defamatory charge, irrespective of motive, by virtue
of its publication and which is not sufficient to defeat the statutory privilege. See
Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921); Davis v. Hearst,
160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530 (1911); Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392(1895); Boyich v. Howell, 221 Cal. App. 2d 801, 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1963) (actual
malice must be pleaded to defeat qualified privilege).
13 A conflict among jurisdictions exists as to what establishes malice sufficient to
defeat the qualified privilege extended to a mercantile agency. Generally, mere negli-
gence in publication of a defamatory statement is not proof of malice. Douglass v.
Daisley, 114 Fed. 628, 629 (1st Cir. 1902); see also 36 Am. JUR. Mercantile Agencies
§ 11 (1941). But there have been cases holding that a failure to exercise reasonable
care and diligence to ascertain the truth destroys any conditional privilege. J. Hartman
& Co. v. Hyman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 Ad. 486 (1926); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191,
331 P.2d 814 (1958); Cossette v. Dun, [1890J 18 Can. Sup. Ct. 222. And in New
York, while mere negligence is not sufficient to impair the privilege, it has been held
that where the communication was so carelessly executed as to be wanton or reckless,
express malice will be inferred. Peoples v. State, 38 N.Y.S.2d 690, 696 (1942).
'4 Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293, 295, 70 At. 1035, 1037 (1908); Hemmens v.
Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 519, 34 N.E. 342, 344 (1893). Contra, see cases cited note 15
infra.
'5 MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959);
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948);
Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1, (1921). Accord,
Miller v. Howe, 345 Ky. 568, 53 S.W.2d 938 (1932); Cline v. Holdrege, 122 Neb.
151, 239 N.W. 639 (1931); Russell v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 118 Pa.
Super. 351, 179 Aft. 798 (1935).
16 Stevens v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 214 Pac. 968 (1923).
17 Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. at 578, 198 Pac. at 6; see 30 CAL. JuR.
21 Libel and Slander § 176 (1956).
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precedent' 8 in reaching this conclusion. 19 Once again, however, the
vehicle of analogy was used, through reliance upon Priestly v.
Superior Court,20 a California criminal case decided by the same
court in 1958.
In Priestly, drugs were found in the defendant's apartment when
a search without a warrant was made by police officers acting on a
tip from two informers. The defendant was arrested and, at his
trial for illegal possession of narcotics, the prosecution tried to estab-
lish probable cause for the search by relying on the information re-
ceived from the two informers. When the defendant tried to obtain
the names of the informers for the purpose of rebutting their testi-
mony, the prosecution relied upon a special statutory privilege2' and
refused to reveal their identity. The Priestly court held that the
defendant was entitled to know his accusers and have a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut them, or the testimony relating to their statements
must be stricken from the record.
The court in Stationers maintained that even though Priestly was
a criminal proceeding the same reasoning and conclusion were ap-
plicable in Stationers, perhaps with even more force. The court
stated:
In the instant case the party withholding the identification of the in-
formers is not a peace officer who is seeking to encourage the free
flow of information helpful to enforcement of the law, but a
corporation in the business of supplying credit information for
pecuniary gain. It would be grossly unjust to permit a defendant, in
the pursuit of his commercial interests, to rely upon the special privi-
lege granted by section 47, subdivision 3, without requiring him to
18 Two English cases, applying the common law privilege rather than a statute, have
held that such sources cannot be protected in this situation. White & Co. v. Credit
Reform Ass'n & Credit Index, [1905] 1 K.B. 653; South Suburban Co-op. Soc'y v.
Orun, [1937] 2 K.B. 690. In White, an action of libel against a trade protection
society was involved. When defendant pleaded a qualified privilege for the publication,
plaintiff sought to administer to the defendant an interrogatory, asking what inquiries
it made as to the truth of the statements complained of, before publishing them, and
from whom it obtained the information on which it relied. Defendant objected on the
grounds that knowledge of the identity of the source was immaterial to the issues
involved. Held, that such an interrogatory was admissible. It should be noted that such
a holding is in accord with the British rule of strict accountability for mercantile
agencies and is not necessarily indicative of American thought on the problem.
19 62 Cal. 2d at 419, 398 P.2d at 790, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
20 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
21 CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1881(5) provides: "A public officer cannot be examined
as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure."
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disclose information in his possession necessary to determine
whether the statements were made without malice .... 22
It is questionable, however, whether the rationale in Priestly is
applicable to the instant case. There appear to be basic differences
between Priestly and Stationers which substantially weaken the for-
mer when used as authority for the decision in the latter.2" Applying
the rule as to revealing sources which was established in Priestly
appears to be not a necessary consequence but a substantial expan-
sion of the doctrine. Priestly involved the constitutional questions of
due process and the right to be confronted by witnesses. 24 In the
instant case, no constitutional guarantee of personal rights was in-
volved. The basic problem in the principal case appears to be what
approach to take in the balancing of public and private interests.
On the one hand, the right of an enterprise to freely trade in credit
reports and the right of businessmen to benefit from their use. On
the other, the right of businessmen not to be deprived unjustly of
their reputations and the co-extensive right to a fair trial on the
merits where their reputations have been unjustly damaged. It can-
not be denied, as implied by the Stationers court, that to allow de-
fendants to establish probable cause without revealing their sources
would create a potential privileged sanctuary from which malicious
and unwarranted libel could be published with impunity.25 If this
were the case, there would no doubt be injury to individuals on
occasion.* However, in view of the ever-increasing use made of these
reports by business and their importance in our credit-oriented econ-
omy, the risk seems almost justified. Surely an upsurge of false re-
ports would not only injure individuals but would threaten the
existence of the agencies themselves, as they are essential to the
business community only as long as their reports maintain a high
degree of accuracy and reliability.2"
22 62 Cal. 2d at 420, 398 P.2d at 790, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
28 Authority of a prior decision is confined to the application of a legal principal
to the same, or substantially the same, state of facts. See Sichterman v. R. M. Hollings.
head Co., 117 Cal. App. 504, 4 P.2d 181 (1931); State v. J. M. Huber Corp., 193
S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); see also 20 Am. Jun. 2D Courts § 190
(1965).
24 This is noted by Justice Carter in his concurring opinion. 50 Cal. 2d at 822, 330
P.2d at 45. It is also indicated by the examination of the authority relied on by the
majority opinion. See People v. Lundy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 244, 311 P.2d 601 (1957);
People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, 310 P.2d 162 (1957); People v. Alaniz, 149
Cal. App. 2d 560, 309 P.2d 71 (1957).
25 62 Cal. 2d at 420, 398 P.2d at 790, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
26 Smith, supra note 8, at 207-08.
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The court's holding in this case may tend to dry up not only
unreliable sources but accurate sources of information as well.
Valuable reports often come from persons or organizations who
have a close business relationship with the subject of the report. It
is not unlikely that such informants may be reluctant to give even
accurate information in the future if they know they may be identi-
fied to their disadvantage 7
However, the supreme court was faced with a choice which
allowed only one reasonable result. The plaintiffs were effectively
prevented from litigating the existence of malice due to the trial
court's deference to the defendants' unsupported declarations of
good faith. In order to uphold the purpose and function of the sum-
mary judgment procedure the supreme court found it necessary to
afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge the source of the
defendants' alleged defamatory statements. For the court to hold
otherwise would have resulted in denying the plaintiffs a cause of
action under the fallacy that no triable issue of fact existed.
J. MICHAEL MCDADE
27 By disadvantage the author does not mean to imply that those furnishing informa-
tion would be facing legal action. It appears clear that absent malice they would be
protected by the statutory privilege. The disadvantage would most likely be economic
and could threaten their business relations with the plaintiff or, in the case of an
employee, could cause him to lose his job.
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